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IMPLICATIONS OF THE THIRD-PARTY DOCTRINE: THE NEW
AGE OF DIGITAL DATA AND CARPENTER
Chelsea Ann Padgett*
Abstract
This Note addresses cell-site location information and the third-party
doctrine while deeply analyzing the U.S. Supreme Court’s recent
decision in Carpenter v. United States. This case has proven itself quite
uninformative as it left the third-party doctrine in a state of disarray and
confusion. This Note argues that there is no Fourth Amendment
protection for information held and developed by a third-party cell phone
carrier, even with technological advances such as cell-site location
information. Because the information is produced by an individual’s cell
phone carrier stamping the individual’s phone with the location of the cell
tower from which it is pulling its service, the user has effectively
consented to such information being shared with a third party and is at
least somewhat aware that the cell-site location information, along with
the phone number dialed, can be provided to the police without a warrant.
There are effective measures, both legislative and judicial, that if
implemented will help fix these privacy issues arising out of
technological advances.
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INTRODUCTION
When the U.S. Supreme Court grants certiorari in a case, it is assumed
that, regardless of the outcome, the American people will have a better
understanding of the law by which they must abide. However, when the
Court releases a narrow opinion that fails to answer significant questions,
it leaves individuals confused and concerned about what the law truly is.
This is exactly what has happened since the recent decision of Carpenter
v. United States1—a case that rattled the effects of the third-party doctrine
with regard to digital data. In Carpenter, the Court addressed a single
issue: whether access to historical cell phone records providing a
comprehensive chronicle of the user’s past movements constitutes a
search deserving protection under the Fourth Amendment.2 This issue is
extremely pertinent to the new age of smartphones and digital data;
however, the Court left behind too many unanswered questions. With
these questions left unanswered, the opinion fails to explain what it means
for the third-party doctrine as a whole. In a 5–4 decision, the Court
determined that access to a user’s past movements through a cell phone
carrier is much the same as the Global Positioning System (GPS) tracking
in United States v. Jones.3 However, the Court stated that this opinion
does not affect the well-known third-party doctrine cases—United States
v. Miller4 and Smith v. Maryland.5
Considering that the third-party doctrine itself is a derivative of such
cases, it is difficult to understand why the Carpenter Court would hold
that cell phone records held by a third party are more analogous to Jones.
This case should not have been decided based on how “effortlessly” such
cell phone data can be compiled6 or how such information resembles that
of the GPS7 but instead on how and under what circumstances that
information is retrieved. The Court stated that a time-stamped record
1. 138 S. Ct. 2206 (2018).
2. Id. at 2211.
3. 565 U.S. 400, 404 (2012) (deciding that the government’s installation of a GPS device
on a target’s vehicle and its use of that device to monitor the vehicle’s movements constitute a
physical “search” of private property); see Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2217.
4. 425 U.S. 435 (1976).
5. 442 U.S. 735 (1979); see Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2217.
6. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2216.
7. See GPS: The Global Positioning System, GPS.GOV, https://www.gps.gov
[https://perma.cc/C82U-K8NB] (last updated Jan. 15, 2020) (describing GPS as a global public
service of the federal government).
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known as cell-site location information (CSLI)8 is similar to that of the
GPS.9 However, this is not the case. The cell phone connects to the closest
cell tower, which in return places its time-stamped CSLI record on the
phone.10 A time stamp therefore shows the relative area the user was in
and in no way provides a precise location.11
Further, it is not out of the ordinary for someone to expect that
information, such as telephone numbers dialed12 and text messages sent,13
is held by a third party—the phone carrier—and can be shared at any
moment with the police. If a reasonable fact finder can determine that an
individual’s phone call and text message logs can be searched and seized
without a warrant, then why is it not possible to assume that the same
goes for the relative location in which the phone call or text message was
made? Additionally, in the new age of digital data, smartphones are now
equipped with applications (apps) such as Snapchat, Instagram,
Facebook, Uber, Find My Friends, and Find My iPhone—all of which
contain maps, location services, and tracking.14 These apps, telephone
calls, text messages, and location devices all have two things in common:
consent and knowledge. Individuals who purchase and use cell phones
have a general understanding that their telephone calls and text messages
will not go through without service or Wi-Fi. Such service is provided by
cell phone towers placed in a variety of locations by their cell phone
provider.15 Individuals who consent to having and using a cell phone are
aware that the location in which they make a phone call is dependent on
which cell phone towers are located nearby.16 Holding that the time
stamps of the cell phone towers are anything other than a means of
providing effective service undermines the validity of Smith, Miller, and
the entire third-party doctrine.
8. Cell-site location information is the data that a cell phone automatically generates each
time it connects to a cell site or a cell phone tower. See Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2211.
9. Id. at 2216.
10. Id. at 2211.
11. See id. at 2218.
12. See Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 743 (1979).
13. See Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2212; Callie Haslag, Note, Technology or Privacy: Should
You Really Have to Choose Only One?, 83 MO. L. REV. 1027, 1037 (2018).
14. See App Store, APPLE, https://www.apple.com/ios/app-store/ [https://perma.cc/F565K2F4]; FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com [https://perma.cc/8TWN-2WRH]; INSTAGRAM,
https://www.instagram.com/ [https://perma.cc/E2FU-CT3W]; SNAPCHAT, https://www.snapchat
.com [https://perma.cc/7EWX-D944]; UBER, https://www.uber.com [https://perma.cc/8XRNZTHH].
15. See Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2211.
16. A mobile device emits electromagnetic radio waves when it tries to make a phone call,
which the closest cell phone tower picks up and connects that signal to a switching center. This
switching center allows the phone call to be connected to another mobile device. See What Is a
Cell Tower?, WHAT’S A G?, https://whatsag.com/g/what-is-a-cell-tower.php [https://perma.cc/
JP77-X3MQ].
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In Part I, this Note discusses important background information of the
search and seizure of a person’s property, including the Fourth
Amendment itself and important Supreme Court cases relating to the
third-party doctrine. Part II analyzes the Supreme Court’s ruling in
Carpenter and why the Court granted certiorari in the case. Additionally,
Part II discusses how the Supreme Court deferred important decisions
within the opinion and failed to provide guidance for the third-party
doctrine moving forward. In Part III, this Note addresses the implications
of the Carpenter decision. Part III discusses three different ways in which
the law can move forward from this decision to determine what exactly
the third-party doctrine is in this new age. Further, Part III discusses a
possible solution to the unanswered questions the Court left behind by
considering how relevant aspects, such as consent and knowledge, relate
to the new age of digital data. Part III also argues that the Court should
have determined that the CSLI is an implied necessity to provide signal
to cell phone users, which is used to make phone calls and send text
messages. Because the information gathered does not amount to that of
the GPS, the Court should have determined that a warrant is not required
to search and seize such information if properly requested under an order
from the Stored Communications Act.17
I. BACKGROUND
Before diving into a dense procedural analysis of the third-party
doctrine, it is necessary to first understand where this doctrine came from
and how it developed over time. This section will discuss the Fourth
Amendment with regard to the search and seizure of a person’s property.
More specifically, it will discuss how the third-party doctrine has evolved
throughout prominent Supreme Court cases such as United States v.
Miller and Smith v. Maryland. Understanding how the third-party
doctrine originated and developed is essential to properly analyze the
Carpenter opinion and recognize its erroneous flaws.

17. Pub. L. No. 99-508, 100 Stat. 1860 (1986) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701–
2712 (2018)); see 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d) (requiring reasonable grounds for believing records are
relevant to material in an ongoing investigation).
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A. A Brief Understanding of the Fourth Amendment
The Fourth Amendment was ratified in 1791 as a part of the Bill of
Rights to protect the fundamental “right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and
seizures.”18 Further, it provides that “no Warrants shall issue, but upon
probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be
seized.”19 However, there are several exigent circumstances that allow
for a search or seizure without a warrant, including: (1) emergency aid,
(2) hot pursuit, and (3) prevention of imminent destruction of evidence.20
Up until the 1960s, the Court viewed Fourth Amendment search
violations as a form of trespass upon one’s property.21 In abandoning the
old trespass test, the Court determined that the two-pronged test that
emerged from Katz v. United States22 was better suited for analyzing
Fourth Amendment search violations.23 Justice Marshall Harlan in his
concurring opinion famously introduced such test, which requires (1)
“that a person have . . . an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy” and
(2) that such expectation is reasonable.24
Although Katz provided an important step in the understanding of the
Fourth Amendment, the ruling in Jones provided an alternative test—
known today as governing Fourth Amendment protection.25 Jones
determined that the government cannot physically intrude upon persons,
houses, papers, or effects to obtain information without violating the
Fourth Amendment.26 As the law has developed and become more
complex over time, so has the understanding of the Fourth Amendment.
For example, in 2001, the Court had to determine whether thermalimaging devices aimed at private homes to scan for heat waves

18. U.S. CONST. amend. IV; see KATHLEEN M. SULLIVAN & NOAH FELDMAN,
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW lxvii (19th ed. 2016).
19. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
20. Kentucky v. King, 563 U.S. 452, 460 (2011).
21. Orin S. Kerr, The Curious History of Fourth Amendment Searches, 2012 SUP. CT. REV.
67, 67.
22. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
23. Kerr, supra note 21, at 67−68.
24. Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
25. See United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 404–05 (2012).
26. See id. (“The Government physically occupied private property for the purpose of
obtaining information. We have no doubt that such a physical intrusion would have been
considered a ‘search’ within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment when it was adopted.”); id.
at 406 (“At bottom, we must ‘assur[e] preservation of that degree of privacy against government
that existed when the Fourth Amendment was adopted.’” (alteration in original) (quoting Kyllo
v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 34 (2001))); id. at 411 n.8.
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constituted a search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.27 The
Court determined that since the device was not for general public use, it
was an intrusion upon an individual’s person and house that would not
otherwise be known without a physical intrusion, which constituted an
unlawful search.28 Further, the Fourth Amendment expanded to protect
cell phone data from inherently unreasonable searches without a warrant
because they contain private information that the Founders intended to
protect.29 Thus, as time progresses and new digital data devices emerge,
the line between what is protected under the Fourth Amendment and what
is not becomes quite blurry. The Court will look to the Fourth
Amendment and established doctrinal tests to determine if such new
technology fits into a category of “persons, houses, papers, and effects.”30
B. A Brief History of the Third-Party Doctrine
When Fourth Amendment rights become more complicated in the face
of technological advances, the Court will often turn to the third-party
doctrine to maintain neutrality in applying the rules regarding such data.31
This doctrine was created as a means for police officers to obtain
information that an individual conveyed to a third party without obtaining
a warrant.32 Upon conveying that information to a third party, such as a
bank33 or a telephone carrier,34 an individual has effectively given up any
reasonable expectation of privacy in the property because the information
is no longer considered private.35 Because such information is no longer
considered private, any search and seizure of the property cannot be
considered a Fourth Amendment search subject to the warrant
requirement.36 The following cases set the standard for the doctrine and
explain its role and effect on the Fourth Amendment.
1. United States v. Miller
In Miller, the Court held that there is no expectation of privacy in
financial records held by a bank.37 In this case, the respondent, Miller,
27. Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 29.
28. Id. at 40.
29. See Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 386 (2014).
30. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
31. See Orin S. Kerr, The Case for the Third-Party Doctrine, 107 MICH. L. REV. 561, 564
(2009).
32. See Simon Stern, The Third-Party Doctrine and the Third Person, 16 NEW CRIM. L.
REV. 364, 365 (2013).
33. See, e.g., United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 436−37 (1976).
34. See, e.g., Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 743 (1979).
35. See Stern, supra note 32, at 365.
36. Id.
37. Miller, 425 U.S. at 437.
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moved to suppress copies of checks and bank records that police officers
had obtained through court-ordered subpoenas.38 Miller had accounts set
up at two different banks but was not aware of any subpoenas.39 The
subpoenas ordered employees to make “all records of accounts, i.e.,
savings, checking, loan or otherwise, in the name of Mr. Mitch Miller”
available for the desired agents.40 Subsequently, the agents obtained “all
checks, deposit slips, two financial statements, and three monthly
statements” from one bank and were “provided with copies of one deposit
slip and one or two checks” from the other.41 Such evidence was used in
Miller’s trial and led to his ultimate conviction, which he appealed by
claiming a violation of his Fourth Amendment rights.42 On appeal, the
court determined that the subpoenas issued were not a part of the
“adequate ‘legal process’” necessary for receiving such documents.43 The
government argued that the appellate court erred because (1) Miller did
not have Fourth Amendment interests in the records; (2) the subpoenas
were not defective; and (3) the evidence should not have been
suppressed.44 Because the Supreme Court reversed the appellate court’s
opinion by determining that Miller had no Fourth Amendment interest to
be protected, it did not discuss arguments two and three.45
The Carpenter Court stated that this reasoning rested on two
significant factors: (1) the act of sharing and (2) “the nature of the
particular documents sought.”46 Because individuals are effectively
“sharing” their information with a third party, it is reasonable to assume
that they no longer have an expectation of privacy held within it.47 Banks,
such as in Miller, represent a perfect third party considering that a person
deposits money and information with the expectation that it will be
properly handled and cared for. Because of the need for banks in modern
society, the Court explained that they are essential parties that have a
substantial stake in all of the respondent’s records and available funds.48
The bank has to have control over the information given to it to function.
Therefore, checks that individuals write are “not confidential
38. Id. at 436.
39. See id. at 437–38.
40. Id. at 437 (emphasis omitted).
41. Id. at 438.
42. See id. at 438−39.
43. Id. at 439 (quoting United States v. Miller, 500 F.2d 751, 758 (5th Cir. 1974), rev’d,
425 U.S. 435 (1976)).
44. Id.
45. Id. at 440.
46. Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2219 (2018) (quoting Miller, 425 U.S. at
442).
47. Id.
48. See Miller, 425 U.S. at 440.
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communications but negotiable instruments to be used in commercial
transactions.”49 Thus, an individual takes the risk of his documents being
revealed to the government and used in an ordinary course of business by
revealing such information to a third party, such as a bank. 50 Due to this
lack of privacy, the Court determined that the documents obtained by the
government were not “private papers” but instead “business records” that
an individual cannot assert ownership or possession over.51
Additionally, the Court cited to the Bank Secrecy Act52 to further its
conclusion that individuals have no reasonable expectation of privacy in
such records.53 Congress passed this Act to ensure that insured depository
institutions maintain adequate records because they can be useful with
regard to national security and protection against domestic and
international terrorism.54 The Court prefers that information held by a
third party that could prove criminal activity be accessible by law
enforcement.55 The Court assumed that such connection was relevant or
else Congress would have never passed the Act in the first place.56
The Court concluded that all of Miller’s bank documents obtained,
including financial statements and deposit slips, were voluntarily
conveyed to the third-party bank and lacked all reasonable expectation of
privacy.57 The physical and voluntary transfer of possession of the
documents led the Court to believe that Miller relinquished his privacy
rights in the property.58 Therefore, in cases where there is no Fourth
Amendment protection, a court is permitted to enter into evidence records
that were obtained from a third party through issuance of a subpoena.59
This is true even in light of a contemplated criminal proceeding.60

49. Id. at 442.
50. See id. at 442–43.
51. Id. at 440 (quoting Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 622 (1886)).
52. Pub. L. No. 91-508, 84 Stat. 1114 (1970) (codified as amended in scattered sections of
12, 15, and 31 U.S.C.).
53. Miller, 425 U.S. at 442–43; see also 12 U.S.C. § 1829b(d) (1970) (stating an express
requirement to keep records of each “check, draft, or other similar instrument received” for deposit
along with identification of the party’s account in which the deposit is made).
54. 12 U.S.C. § 1829b(a).
55. See Miller, 425 U.S. at 444.
56. See id. at 442–43.
57. See id. at 443−44.
58. See id. at 442−43.
59. See id. at 444.
60. Id.
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2. Smith v. Maryland
Three years after Miller, the Court determined that the installation and
use of a pen register does not constitute a Fourth Amendment search.61
The Court concluded that individuals do not have a reasonable
expectation of privacy in dialed phone numbers and therefore the use of
pen registers cannot constitute a search.62 In Smith, after finding out the
license plate of a man continuously making threatening phone calls to a
woman whom he previously robbed, the police requested that a pen
register63 be installed on his home telephone to record any dialed
numbers.64 The police successfully traced the telephone calls received by
the woman to the man’s home telephone and subsequently arrested him
for the robbery.65 The Court turned to the holding in Katz to determine if
the government obtaining the pen register information from the telephone
company constituted a “search” under the Fourth Amendment.66 A twopronged test emerged from Katz that determines whether an activity
constitutes a search under the Fourth Amendment: (1) whether the
individual has exhibited an actual and subjective expectation of privacy
and (2) whether such subjective expectation of privacy is reasonable and
one that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable.67
The Court determined that it was doubtful that individuals hold any
actual expectation of privacy in the numbers they dial on their phone
because the conveyance of a phone number to the telephone company to
complete a call is inevitable.68 Further, the Court found that even if an
individual has some subjective expectation of privacy in dialed phone
numbers, it is not one that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable
because a third party is necessary to even make phone calls.69 Therefore,
because the Court concluded that there is no reasonable expectation of
privacy in telephone records voluntarily given to a third party, the Katz
test was not satisfied.70
61. See Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 745–46 (1979).
62. Id.
63. A pen register is “a device or process which records or decodes dialing, routing,
addressing, or signaling information transmitted by an instrument or facility from which a wire or
electronic communication is transmitted.” 18 U.S.C. § 3127(3) (2018).
64. Smith, 442 U.S. at 737.
65. Id.
66. See id. at 739.
67. See id. at 739–40; Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967) (deeming what an
individual “seeks to preserve as private, even in an area accessible to the public,” as
“constitutionally protected”).
68. See Smith, 442 U.S. at 742.
69. See id. at 743.
70. See id. at 745−46.
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Additionally, the Court dismissed any property claim by the
individual.71 Considering that the pen register was installed and used on
the telephone company’s property, the individual could not claim that the
police invaded any constitutionally protected area because there were no
applicable property rights.72 Further, the Court distinguished the pen
register from the listening device in Katz because a search with the former
cannot provide the contents of communications or even distinguish
whether a communication ever existed.73 Overall, the Court found that
any individual who voluntarily dials a phone number on his telephone
assumes the risk of disclosure because he lacks a reasonable expectation
of privacy in the dialed number.74 Even if an expectation of privacy was
individually harbored, it is not legitimate.75
3. Criticisms of the Third-Party Doctrine
Throughout the evolution of the third-party doctrine, it has been
subjected to much criticism. Justice Thurgood Marshall wrote a dissent
in Smith, discussing relevant privacy factors intertwined within the thirdparty doctrine.76 At the very basis of the doctrine, Justice Marshall was
not convinced that individuals know that the phone calls they make are
monitored by phone companies for internal purposes or, more
specifically, that such information can be made available to the public or
the government.77 Justice Marshall suggested that the Court was
misguided in holding that individuals have “assumed the risk” of
governmental disclosure for two reasons: (1) it is unreasonable to state
that an individual has assumed the risk when there are no realistic
alternative choices and (2) making risk analysis dispositive in
determining what is a reasonable privacy expectation allows the
government to define the scope of Fourth Amendment protections.78
Justice Marshall’s dissent argued that such misguided conception forces
individuals to assume the risk of activities most would consider daily
tasks in a free and open society.79
Additionally, Justice Sonia Sotomayor criticized the third-party
doctrine in light of modern technology in Jones.80 In Jones, the
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.

See id. at 741.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 744.
Id. at 745.
Id. at 749 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
Id.
Id. at 749−50 (quoting id. at 744–45 (majority opinion)).
See id. at 750.
See United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 413–14 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
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government placed a GPS tracking device on an individual’s vehicle to
track his movements for a period of four weeks, all without his consent
or a warrant.81 The Court found, and Justice Sotomayor agreed, that such
intrusion on his privacy was a violation of the Fourth Amendment.82 The
majority opinion relied on a trespassory test to determine if the search
violated the Fourth Amendment.83 Under the test, the Fourth Amendment
only protects against searches with regard to the enumerated persons,
houses, papers, and effects.84 Thus, the Katz reasonable expectation of
privacy test and the common law trespassory test laid out in Jones work
together to form a doctrinal examination of Fourth Amendment search
violations.85 However, Justice Samuel Alito argued that the current
doctrinal examination of Fourth Amendment searches may begin to
exclude many types of surveillance that lack physical intrusion.86 With
electronic surveillance and nontrespassory circumstances increasing
rapidly, it becomes difficult to ascertain if the common law trespassory
test applies or whether the Court must turn to Katz for situations involving
mere transmission of electronic signals. The majority in Jones understood
that issues concerning modern technology are going to affect how Fourth
Amendment search violations are examined; however, it provided no
resolution for these pressing issues.87
Further, Justice Sotomayor touched on the privacy issues regarding
the GPS surveillance used in Jones’s vehicle.88 She explained that the
GPS monitoring raises privacy concerns under the Fourth Amendment
because it “generates a precise, comprehensive record of a person’s
public movements that reflects a wealth of detail about her familial,
political, professional, religious, and sexual associations.”89 Such lowcost monitoring is an invasion of one’s most intimate aspects of life and
expectation of privacy.90 Additionally, permitting such GPS monitoring
impairs the checks on law enforcement used to prevent abusive police
practices.91 Due to a lack of regulation of police officers and easy access
81. Id. at 403 (majority opinion).
82. Id. at 413 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (“[A] search within the meaning of the Fourth
Amendment occurs, at a minimum, ‘[w]here, as here, the Government obtains information by
physically intruding on a constitutionally protected area.’” (second alteration in original) (quoting
id. at 406 n.3 (majority opinion))).
83. See id. at 411 n.8 (majority opinion).
84. See id.
85. See id. at 414 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
86. See id. at 427 (Alito, J., concurring).
87. See id. at 412–13 (majority opinion).
88. See id. at 416 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
89. Id. at 415.
90. See id. at 416.
91. Id. at 415–17.
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to low-cost surveillance, Justice Sotomayor argued that GPS monitoring
should potentially be highly regulated under the Fourth Amendment
because of how intrusive it is on one’s personal life, especially when an
individual does not expect the government to obtain such information.92
Some scholars dive into what the word “expectation” necessarily
means with regards to the Katz reasonable expectation of privacy test.93
Justice Harlan explained that a “subjective” expectation of privacy is not
applicable because it cannot add to or detract from an individual’s Fourth
Amendment claim.94 This is proven by the second part of the rule, which
demands that such expectation be both reasonable and one that society is
prepared to recognize as such.95 Therefore, it is argued that Katz and the
Fourth Amendment “tell us what we should demand of the
government.”96 Because of such controversy about the meaning of the
rule itself, it has been difficult for the Court to estimate, and subsequently
make decisions on, activities of the police considering that most of what
they do is not specifically authorized by law.97 This uncertainty of the law
is not only frustrating for individuals and police officers but is also
“frightening” for the Court to estimate, specifically when it comes to
ruling on cases concerning electronic data in the new digital age—where
the doctrinal rule is quite muddled.98 As one scholar put it, the “rapid
technology advances . . . have underlined the possibility of worse horrors
yet to come.”99
92. Cf. id. at 416–18 (“More fundamentally, it may be necessary to reconsider the premise
that an individual has no reasonable expectation of privacy in information voluntarily disclosed
to third parties. This approach is ill suited to the digital age, in which people reveal a great deal
of information about themselves to third parties in the course of carrying out mundane tasks.
People disclose the phone numbers that they dial or text to their cellular providers; the URLs that
they visit and the e-mail addresses with which they correspond to their Internet service providers;
and the books, groceries, and medications they purchase to online retailers. . . . I for one doubt
that people would accept without complaint the warrantless disclosure to the Government of a list
of every Web site they had visited in the last week, or month, or year. But whatever the societal
expectations, they can attain constitutionally protected status only if our Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence ceases to treat secrecy as a prerequisite for privacy. I would not assume that all
information voluntarily disclosed to some member of the public for a limited purpose is, for that
reason alone, disentitled to Fourth Amendment protection.” (citations omitted)).
93. See, e.g., Anthony G. Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L.
REV. 349, 384 (1974) (assessing what the word “expectation” means in the Katz test considering
that the term is not used in the opinion).
94. See id.; see also Orin Kerr, Katz Has Only One Step: The Irrelevance of Subjective
Expectations, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. 113, 114 (2014) (claiming that there is only one step to the Katz
test because subjective expectations are irrelevant).
95. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring).
96. Amsterdam, supra note 93, at 384.
97. Id. at 386.
98. See id.
99. Id.
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To that end, many other scholars have also criticized how easily the
government overcomes such an expectation of privacy.100 This ease of
overcoming the law is furthered by advancements in technology because
larger quantities of private information are being shared with the
government
without
repercussion.101
Overall,
technological
advancements continue to complicate what the third-party doctrine
governs. Although the Katz opinion considered technological
advancements, it simply was not enough to guide the Court going
forward.102 In fact, since Katz, it has been difficult for the Court to
determine how the Fourth Amendment applies to electronic
communications and digital information.103
II. CARPENTER V. UNITED STATES: NEWEST APPROACH TO THE THIRDPARTY DOCTRINE
Fourth Amendment rights are continuously interpreted as new facts
and instances are discovered in cases such as Carpenter v. United States.
This section will discuss Carpenter in its entirety as it refers to not only
Fourth Amendment rights, but how it does not appeal to the third-party
doctrine. Realizing why this case is so vital to criminal procedure moving
forward stems from understanding why the Supreme Court initially
granted certiorari, and how its holding effects the way in which courts
will discuss Fourth Amendment third-party issues. This section will not
only explain the Carpenter case but will also reflect upon how the
Supreme Court left the third-party doctrine in a state of disarray with its
lack of guidance on such relevant issues.
A. Why the Supreme Court Granted Certiorari
In 2011, four men were arrested for a series of robberies of Radio
Shack and T-Mobile stores across Detroit.104 One of the men confessed
to the robberies and implicated the three others along with fifteen
accomplices, most of whom he provided cell phone numbers for.105
Prosecutors requested court orders to obtain cell phone records for each
of the men arrested and their accomplices under the Stored

100. Michael W. Price, Rethinking Privacy: Fourth Amendment Papers and the Third-Party
Doctrine, 8 J. NAT’L SECURITY L. & POL’Y 247, 262 (2016).
101. See id.
102. See id. at 263–64.
103. Id. at 264.
104. Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2212 (2018).
105. Id.
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Communications Act.106 Subsequently, a federal magistrate judge issued
two court orders directing MetroPCS and Sprint to disclose all of
Carpenter’s CSLI for call origination and termination during the fourmonth period in which the robberies occurred.107 Collectively, the
government obtained 12,898 location points from the cellular carriers,
which effectively placed Carpenter near the scene of the robberies.108
Carpenter was arrested and charged with six counts of robbery and six
counts of carrying a firearm during a federal crime of violence.109 He
moved to suppress the CSLI, arguing that obtaining the records was a
clear violation of his Fourth Amendment right to privacy because the
police needed a warrant, rather than a court order, under the Stored
Communications Act.110 The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
affirmed the denial of the defendants’ motion to suppress the CSLI.111 It
held that Carpenter had no reasonable expectation of privacy in the CSLI
because he voluntarily shared it with his wireless carrier.112 The court
considered the CSLI business records, which do not receive Fourth
Amendment protection.113 After rehearing en banc was denied in June of
2016,114 the Supreme Court granted certiorari to hear Carpenter on June
5, 2017.115 The defendants, Timothy Ivory Carpenter and Timothy
Michael Sanders, brought the case to the Supreme Court to answer one
question: whether accessing historical cell phone records that provide a
comprehensive chronicle of the user’s past movements is a violation of
an individual’s Fourth Amendment right to privacy.116
Additionally, it is important to note exactly where this CSLI comes
from. At trial, a Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) agent provided
expert testimony explaining how agents make “maps” out of the recorded
information.117 Every time a cell phone connects to a wireless network, a
time stamp is logged with the carrier, which records the particular cell
106. Id.; see also 18 U.S.C. § 2701 (2018) (making it an offense to intentionally access a
facility that provides electronic communication services without prior authorization); id.
§ 2703(d) (requiring a court order for any governmental agency to receive such stored
communications).
107. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2212.
108. See id.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 2213.
112. Id.
113. See id.; see also Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 743 (1979) (explaining that telephone
companies make records of relevant information for legitimate business purposes, which
essentially makes them business records).
114. United States v. Carpenter, 2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 13024 (6th Cir. June 29, 2016).
115. Carpenter v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 2211 (2017).
116. See Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2211.
117. Id. at 2212−13.
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cite and sector used.118 Essentially, every time an individual uses his cell
phone, a stamp is placed on his network that records the location of the
cell tower used to make the phone call. CSLI can provide near-perfect
surveillance—ranging from one-eighth to four square miles—and can be
traced back up to five years.119 However, because of modern technology,
wireless carriers can now pinpoint a phone’s location within fifty meters
by calculating the time and range in which cell towers are struck.120
Because of such information, the FBI agents were able to make “maps,”
which placed Carpenter’s phone near the location of the robberies.121
B. The Holding and its Effect on the Third-Party Doctrine
The Carpenter decision itself is narrow and does not disturb the
applicability of Smith or Miller, nor does it call into question conventional
surveillance techniques and tools, such as security cameras.122 Due to the
Court’s finding that obtaining CSLI from a wireless carrier is a violation
of Fourth Amendment privacy concerns, it is now necessary to obtain a
warrant subject to probable cause before acquiring such records.123 Thus,
prosecutors may no longer obtain court orders under the Stored
Communications Act to obtain CSLI from wireless carriers because the
Act only requires “reasonable grounds,” rather than probable cause, to
show relevance for the records.124 With regard to the third-party doctrine,
the Court determined that if “modern-day equivalents of an individual’s
own ‘papers’ or ‘effects’” do not fall under any protected category under
the doctrine, then full Fourth Amendment protection should apply.125 The
Court further attempted to narrow its ruling by explaining that such
warrant requirement only applies when an individual “has a legitimate
privacy interest in records held by a third party.”126 Exceptions to the rule,
however, do apply. The government may conduct a warrantless search of
CSLI if exigent circumstances apply, including protecting individual
safety, being in the act of hot pursuit, or preventing imminent destruction
of evidence.127
118. Id. at 2212.
119. See id. at 2218.
120. Id. at 2219.
121. Id. at 2213.
122. Id. at 2220.
123. See id.
124. Id. at 2221 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d) (2012)).
125. Id. at 2222 (quoting id. at 2230 (Kennedy, J., dissenting)).
126. Id.
127. Id. at 2222−23; see, e.g., Kentucky v. King, 563 U.S. 452, 455 (2011) (preservation of
evidence exception); Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 400 (2006) (safety exception);Warden
v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 310 (1967) (Fortas, J., concurring) (hot pursuit exception).
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Although this case could have provided a massive and necessary
reconstruction of the third-party doctrine in the face of modern
technology, it failed to do so. As the Court explained, the decision is very
narrowly tailored to answer the specific question at issue, which only
concerned CSLI records obtained from a cellular or wireless carrier
without probable cause for a warrant.128 The largest remaining concern is
that the Court failed to explain how this case fits in with the third-party
doctrine, especially considering that it does not disturb the application of
Smith or Miller.129 Some scholars claim that this case is merely an
extension of Katz and Smith, explaining that because telephone booths
are essentially extinct, the growing expectation of privacy in modern
technology, such as cell phones, must be afforded Fourth Amendment
protection.130 However, the Court did not explicitly, or implicitly for that
matter, claim such an extension of existing precedent, but it did claim that
Carpenter in no manner affects the overall outcome of Smith or Miller.131
Just because the types and uses of telephones have evolved over time, it
does not follow that the underlying concept of voluntarily giving
information to a third party must differ as a result.132 So long as the
concept remains the same, so should the doctrinal process governing it.
A series of dissents expressed Carpenter’s many implications for the
third-party doctrine. Justice Anthony Kennedy explained that the Court’s
decision will have ramifications that extend far beyond cell-site records
considering that it failed to provide clear guidelines for law enforcement
to follow.133 He also pointed out that the Court failed to explain what
makes something a distinct category of information such as bank and
phone records.134 Law enforcement must estimate which records they are
permitted to obtain prior to getting a warrant, so long as there are no clear
guidelines directing them on such distinct categories of information.135
By not implementing Carpenter into the set precedent of Smith and
Miller, the Court effectively led the future of the third-party doctrine

128. See Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2220–21.
129. See id. at 2220.
130. Daniel K. Gelb, Why Carpenter v. United States Warrants a Warrant for Our
Whereabouts, CRIM. JUST., Spring 2018, at 35, 36.
131. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2220.
132. See Orin S. Kerr, The Fourth Amendment and New Technologies: Constitutional Myths
and the Case for Causation, 102 MICH. L. REV. 801, 828 (2004) (“New technologies commonly
expose information that in the past would have remained hidden, resulting in meager Fourth
Amendment protection in new technologies.”). But see Gelb, supra note 130, at 36.
133. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2234 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
134. Id.
135. See id.
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down an “uncharted course,” forcing judges and defendants into
“guessing for years to come.”136
On another note, Justice Clarence Thomas and Justice Samuel Alito
both explained the importance of recognizing when document possession
rests with a party other than the defendant.137 Justice Thomas claimed that
Carpenter did not have any reasonable expectation of privacy in the cellsite records because the government obtained records that were created,
maintained, and controlled solely by MetroPCS and Sprint, not
Carpenter.138 Justice Thomas further elaborated that the Katz test should
have no basis within the Fourth Amendment because it confronts policy
instead of law.139 Essentially, he argued that the Katz test undermines the
entirety of a person’s Fourth Amendment protections because it changes
the meaning of the word “search.”140 Justice Alito added that the Fourth
Amendment does not protect the persons, houses, papers, and effects of
others—such right is an individual right.141 He argued that requiring
probable cause to obtain cell-site records is a mistake simply because the
documents were ordered by a functional equivalent of a court subpoena
without any evidence of a “search.”142 The Court ignored basic
distinctions between an actual Fourth Amendment “search” and a search
of a party’s own private records through the production of specific
documents.143 Searching a party’s private records is only a search of an
individual’s own source of information and thus does not require
probable cause.144 Justice Alito further explained that the Court failed to
follow Oklahoma Press Publishing Co. v. Walling,145 which states that “a
showing of probable cause [is] not necessary so long as” Congress
properly authorizes the investigation “and the documents sought are
relevant.”146 The records received in Carpenter were under court order
from the government and thus should have been immune from any Fourth
Amendment challenges.147

136. Id. (quoting Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 401 (2014)).
137. See id. at 2235 (Thomas, J., dissenting); id. at 2257 (Alito, J., dissenting).
138. See id. at 2235 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
139. Id. at 2236.
140. See id. at 2238 (explaining that Katz defines “search” to mean “any violation of a
reasonable expectation of privacy,” whereas the Fourth Amendment intends to protect against
violations of unreasonable searches).
141. Id. at 2257 (Alito, J., dissenting).
142. See id. at 2247.
143. Id.
144. See id.
145. 327 U.S. 186 (1946).
146. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2254 (Alito, J., dissenting).
147. Id. at 2255.
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Subsequently, Justice Neil Gorsuch argued that people today use the
internet and smartphones for almost everything.148 Thus, Smith and
Miller are relevant but no longer have a clear reach or meaning.149 Justice
Gorsuch argued that the Court’s balancing inquiry—asking whether
disclosure to a third party outweighs privacy interests—inevitably
stemmed from Katz, but does nothing more than provide a more weighty
analysis with little guidance.150 He introduced the idea that accessing and
possessing records can be a type of legal bailment by exploring doubt that
exclusive control of property is necessary to assert a Fourth Amendment
right.151 This differs completely from the customary property rights
shown in Smith and Miller considering that all Fourth Amendment rights
are extinguished upon transfer of the property to a third party.152
However, Justice Gorsuch argued that individuals should not have to lose
all Fourth Amendment rights simply because they are forced to hand over
their information to a third party.153 Modern technology complicates
these concepts—morphing black letter law into questionable
determinations with an unsettled pathway. Cases such as Carpenter are
important not only for understanding the basis of the third-party doctrine
but also for keeping the Court current with modern technology. Failure
to do so makes it difficult to conceptualize the law, especially when the
most up-to-date case fails to consider the loopholes created by modern
technology.
Admittedly, it is difficult for Justices to draft an opinion that
encompasses all possible issues. However, it is important for the Court to
at least address the most pressing issues surrounding the case at hand. In
Carpenter, the most pressing issues were (1) whether Carpenter’s CSLI
was illegally obtained from his provider violating his Fourth Amendment
rights and (2) how the exact ruling would fit in with the current thirdparty doctrine, including Smith and Miller.154 The Court specifically
stated that its opinion did not affect Smith and Miller, which is an
oversight likely to cause disarray in the lower courts due to lack of
guidance.155 The Court claimed that it failed to extend Smith and Miller
to Carpenter because the “unique nature” of the CSLI made it more
148. Id. at 2262 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).
149. See id. at 2267.
150. Id.
151. See id. at 2268−69.
152. See id. at 2269.
153. Id. at 2270.
154. Id. at 2211 (majority opinion); Eunice Park, Protecting the Fourth Amendment After
Carpenter in the Digital Age: What Gadget Next?, ORANGE COUNTY L. MAG., May 2018, at 35,
35 (“[T]he Court’s holding in Carpenter and how it arrives at it will have significant repercussions
for lower courts trying to address the next Fourth Amendment technology-based challenges.”).
155. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2220.
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intrusive on an individual’s Fourth Amendment rights than phone or bank
records.156 However, such information is no more intrusive than
obtaining an individual’s log of phone calls or complete bank records.
Considering that Smith and Miller are the basis of the third-party doctrine,
it is difficult to understand why the Court did not follow precedent and
why this new ruling did not affect these cases. Failing to answer these
questions in a clear and concise manner only leaves confusion for the
lower courts and police officers attempting to follow the law when
obtaining similar information. Chief Justice John Roberts had the
opportunity to write a significant opinion regarding the nature of the
third-party doctrine but instead drafted one that made dense law even
more difficult to follow.
III. IMPLICATIONS OF THE CARPENTER DECISION—WHAT IS NEXT?
There are three possible options for fixing the limitations of
Carpenter. First, the Supreme Court can collectively determine that it
properly decided Carpenter and thus remain with the current law. Even
if the Court chooses this option, it should at least complete a thorough
review of the case. Second, individuals can call for legislative action to
determine how these new technological advances affect the legal system.
Considering that increased technology has drastically affected the
understanding of the third-party doctrine, it may be necessary for the
legislature to rectify these issues. Lastly, the Supreme Court could reverse
its decision in Carpenter, agreeing that the technology at issue in the case
was not as advanced as the Court attempted to make it seem.
A. Remain with Carpenter
Although the Court drafted a dense opinion regarding the pressing
question of placing CSLI within the parameters of the legal system, it did
not thoroughly render the decision. Instead of placing this case, among
many others, under the third-party doctrine, the Court distinguished it
from the doctrine and required a warrant for obtaining information held
by a third party.157 Effectively veering away from this well-known
doctrine provides a state of uncertainty as to what exactly does fall under
the doctrine and what does not. After all, like in Smith, the Court admitted
that telephone subscribers are aware that the numbers they dial are used
for a variety of business purposes and thus voluntarily consent to such
information being exposed in the ordinary course of business.158
However, the Court somehow concluded that even though the third-party
156. Id.
157. See id. at 2221.
158. Id. at 2216.
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principles of Smith and Miller were implicated, that is not enough to
overcome Fourth Amendment protection.159 The Fourth Amendment
undermines that conclusion because it only protects against physical
intrusions of one’s body or property, which does not extend to that of a
third party.160 Without physical intrusion on an individual’s personal
property, the Fourth Amendment protection does not apply and should
remain subject to a Katz interpretation.161
Carpenter is extremely similar to the well-established precedent of
Smith, which has effectively formed the third-party doctrine into what it
is today.162 If the CSLI technology was created, installed, and used on
service provider property, then Carpenter should not be able to claim his
property was invaded or unconstitutionally intruded upon—because it
was never his property in the first place.163 Carpenter did not form this
technology, nor did he assist in forming the information other than by
making the calls.164 He simply dialed phone numbers, which the Court
previously classified as business records subject to the third-party
doctrine.165
The Court in Carpenter countered this argument by stating that Smith
pointed out that pen registers reveal little identifying information,166
while claiming that CSLI entails a “detailed chronicle of a person’s
physical presence.”167 This argument, however, was proven invalid when
the government explained that such information, taken from the cell
phone, was less precise than GPS information because it only places the
location “within a wedge-shaped sector ranging from one-eighth to four
square miles.”168 In no plausible manner can the CSLI pulled from a cell
phone be equivalent to that of GPS monitoring. It is true that when the
government tracks the location of a cell phone it can achieve a near159. Id. at 2217.
160. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
161. United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 414 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring); see also
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 349–50 (1967) (recognizing that the proper Fourth
Amendment inquiry cannot focus solely on physical intrusion); Christian Bennardo, Note, The
Fourth Amendment, CSLI Tracking, and the Mosaic Theory, 85 FORDHAM L. REV. 2385, 2411–
12 (2017) (explaining that the trespass-based approach of the Fourth Amendment is inapplicable
to cases such as Jones, considering that there is no physical intrusion involved with CSLI).
162. See Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 745 (1979).
163. Cf. id. at 742.
164. Cf. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2235 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
165. See Smith, 422 U.S. at 743 (“Telephone users, in sum, typically know that they must
convey numerical information to the phone company; that the phone company has facilities for
recording this information; and that the phone company does in fact record this information for a
variety of legitimate business purposes.”).
166. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2219.
167. Id. at 2220.
168. Id. at 2218.
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perfect surveillance; however, that was not the issue or what the
government did in Carpenter.169 After all, CSLI is only a collection of
time stamps placed on a cell phone considered incidental to finding the
best signal in that particular location.170 Each time a signal is found, the
cell phone records it in order for the user to make a phone call or send a
text message.171 So, technically, a user does in fact assume the risk of his
physical movements being tracked by the government because he
voluntarily places that information in his service provider’s hands.172
However, the physical movements the Court attempts to portray as
“GPS” are nothing more than the location of a series of cell phone towers.
Holding that time stamps from cell towers are anything other than an
incidental result of providing effective telephone service undermines the
validity of the third-party doctrine. Considering the many inconsistencies
and varying legal dilemmas within Carpenter, why should the Court keep
an opinion in place that only confuses the legal system and the citizens
who must abide by it? The answer is simple, it should not.
B. Ask for Legislative Action
Instead of the judicial system determining how these technological
advances affect privacy rights, it is possible to leave this issue for the
legislature to decide. This could be done by acknowledging that one’s
constitutional right to privacy is at stake, but technological advances have
made it nearly impossible for the judicial system to resolve that privacy
concern without implicating other branches of the government. Thus, the
question could become nonjusticiable due to its political nature.173
The right to privacy is essentially the right to personal autonomy.
Although the Constitution does not explicitly provide for the right to
privacy or for a general right to personal autonomy, the Supreme Court
has repeatedly ruled that a right to personal autonomy is implied in the
“zones of privacy” created by specific constitutional guarantees.174 These
169. Id.
170. See id. at 2211.
171. See id.
172. See Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 744–45 (1979) (explaining that a telephone user
assumes the risk of information disclosure because he voluntarily conveys the information in the
ordinary course of business); see also United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 430–31 (2012) (Alito,
J., concurring) (explaining that it is best to apply Fourth Amendment protection and ask whether
GPS tracking is more intrusive than reasonably anticipated).
173. See John Harrison, The Political Question Doctrines, 67 AM. U. L. REV. 457, 528 (2017)
(explaining that the political question doctrine tells courts how to decide cases, which then leaves
individual jurisdictions to decide for themselves how to resolve disputes).
174. Alex Alben, “Reasonable Zones of Privacy”—The Supreme Court’s Struggle to Find
Clarity in the American Landscape Regarding Fourth Amendment Rights, 12 WASH. J.L.TECH. &
ARTS 145, 147 (2017) (explaining that zones of privacy have evolved over time but essentially
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zones of privacy were created in multiple aspects of the Bill of Rights,
which the Founders intended as further protection to U.S. citizens against
government.175 Due to increased technological advances, individuals
attempt to expand this concept of privacy to find such protection in a
modern world.176 However, these limits cannot exceed due process
protection. Thus, when attempting to expand these privacy limits, it is
necessary to ask whether the government has an adequate reason for
taking away a person’s life, liberty, or property.177 In Carpenter, the issue
was whether an individual has a privacy interest in CSLI held by cell
phone providers.178 To be covered by constitutional zones of privacy, it
must be determined that such privacy concern is a fundamental right179
or liberty. The constitutional standard for determining if a right is
fundamental is often dictated by Palko v. Connecticut.180 In that case, the
Court noted that fundamental rights are something objectively and deeply
rooted in this nation’s history and tradition.181 Further, the right must be
implicit in the concept of ordered liberty such that neither liberty nor
justice would exist if the right was sacrificed.182 However, tradition can
be a tricky concept. Tradition is a living, breathing thing and acts as a
rational continuum, which broadly includes a freedom from all
define what rights are protected under the Fourth Amendment); see also Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S.
589, 598–600 (1977) (discussing the concept of zones of privacy as it relates to certain important
personal decisions).
175. See Isidore Silver, The Future of Constitutional Privacy, 21 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 211, 216–
17 (1977).
176. See id. at 222–24 (“Privacy is unique in that it derives little independent protection by
precedent and none from the text of the Constitution while, paradoxically, it is recognized as a
fundamental social value.”).
177. See Substantive Due Process, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (“The
doctrine . . . require[s] legislation to be fair and reasonable in content and to further a legitimate
governmental objective.”).
178. See supra notes 107–10 and accompanying text
179. See Fundamental Right, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 177 (“A right derived
from natural or fundamental law.”).
180. 302 U.S. 319 (1937), overruled by Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969).
181. See id. at 325 (finding that a right is not fundamental where its abolition does not
“violate a ‘principle of justice so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be
ranked as fundamental’” (first quoting Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934),
overruled in part by Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964); then quoting Brown v. Mississippi, 297
U.S. 278, 285 (1936); and then quoting Herbert v. Louisiana, 272 U.S. 312, 316 (1926))); see also
Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720–21 (1997) (“[W]e have regularly observed that the
Due Process Clause specially protects those fundamental rights and liberties which are,
objectively, ‘deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition,’ and ‘implicit in the concept of
ordered liberty,’ such that ‘neither liberty nor justice would exist if they were sacrificed.’”
(citations omitted) (first quoting Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977) (plurality
opinion); and then quoting Palko, 302 U.S. at 325, 326)).
182. Palko, 302 U.S. at 324–26.
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substantial arbitrary impositions and purposeless restraints. 183 Thus,
employing tradition alone to determine whether a right is fundamental
does not provide jurisprudence with much certainty.184
It is well established that individuals have a constitutional right to
privacy regarding their persons, houses, papers, and effects.185 Carpenter
expanded such constitutional right to encompass an individual’s CSLI
obtained from his cell service provider.186 Thus, the Court determined
that CSLI is personal and private to the individual, which grants full
protection under the Fourth Amendment.187 In doing so, the Court simply
determined that an individual held privacy rights in the information but
failed to discuss whether such information was implicit in the ordered
concept of liberty or rooted in tradition. Accordingly, scholars have
argued that if CSLI protection does not fall under the third-party doctrine
as the Court determined, it should be left for the legislature to decide.188
Because of these disparities, it may be best to grant the legislature the
opportunity to analyze expert opinions, expert testimony, and public
opinion on an equal playing field while balancing important government
interests.189 The Court failed to explain why it categorized CSLI under
the fundamental right to privacy blanket so quickly. Thus, it may be
reasonable to consider CSLI protection as a political question.
A political question is not suitable for judicial resolution because it is
more suitable for congressional review. There are two strands of the
modern political doctrine: (1) textual (some matters are committed to the
unreviewable discretion of the political branches) and (2) prudential
(some otherwise legal questions ought to be left to the other branches as
a matter of prudence).190 The standard for the political question doctrine
is the Baker v. Carr191 evidence test, which uses six factors to determine
183. Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 543 (1961); see also Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S.
479, 501 (1965) (Harlan, J., concurring) (“[Judicial self-restraint] will be achieved in this area, as
in other constitutional areas, only by continual insistence upon respect for the teachings of
history . . . .”).
184. See Adam B. Wolf, Fundamentally Flawed: Tradition and Fundamental Rights, 57 U.
MIAMI L. REV. 101, 154 (2002).
185. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
186. Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2217 (2018).
187. See id.
188. See Samantha G. Zimmer, Student Article, Cell Phone or Government Tracking
Device?: Protecting Cell Site Location Information with Probable Cause, 56 DUQ. L. REV. 107,
125–26 (2018) (claiming that the Supreme Court is not the only implicated body when authorizing
the definition and placement of CSLI within Fourth Amendment protection and that the legislature
should take issue with CSLI).
189. Id. at 136.
190. Zachary Baron Shemtob, Note, The Political Question Doctrines: Zivotofsky v. Clinton
and Getting Beyond the Textual-Prudential Paradigm, 104 GEO. L.J. 1001, 1002 (2016).
191. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
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whether a question is political in nature.192 Only one of these factors
needs to be met to consider the question nonjusticiable.193 With regard to
the question of CSLI protection, there is currently a lack of judicially
discoverable and manageable standards resolving such issue.194 Although
the Supreme Court has attempted to resolve the issue, it failed to
recognize that CSLI is no more than ordinary business records held by
the service provider and to consider future technological advances that
will continuously poke at the current third-party doctrine. Therefore,
Congress may be able to provide a statutory resolution that offers a more
precise and uniform standard that courts and citizens can effectively rely
upon and understand.195
C. Reverse Carpenter
Although legislation may be a valid option that would effectively
provide a standardized resolution for technological advancements under
the right to privacy, this issue should continue to remain within the
judicial system. The third-party doctrine has been around since the 1970s
and courts have effectively handled privacy issues regarding the Fourth
Amendment in a clear and concise manner—until Carpenter. Although it
may take some time, the Court has the ability to both reverse Carpenter
and determine that not all technological advances amount to an
infringement upon one’s Fourth Amendment rights. Although technology
poses a continuing threat to individual privacy,196 certain aspects of life
192. See id. at 217.
193. See id. (“Prominent on the surface of any case held to involve a political question is
found a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political
department; or a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it; or the
impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial
discretion; or the impossibility of a court’s undertaking independent resolution without expressing
lack of the respect due coordinate branches of government; or an unusual need for unquestioning
adherence to a political decision already made; or the potentiality of embarrassment from
multifarious pronouncements by various departments on one question.”).
194. Id.
195. Zimmer, supra note 188, at 136–37.
196. See, e.g., Jemima Kiss, Does Technology Pose a Threat to Our Private Life?, GUARDIAN
(Aug. 20, 2010, 7:06 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2010/aug/21/facebookplaces-google [https://perma.cc/PC6Z-6ZXW] (“The rapid pace of development by technology
companies often throws up new cultural and ethical challenges.”); Vivek Wadhwa, Laws and
Ethics Can’t Keep Pace with Technology, MIT TECH. REV. (Apr. 15, 2014),
https://www.technologyreview.com/s/526401/laws-and-ethics-cant-keep-pace-with-technology/
[https://perma.cc/6Y84-9549] (“[E]ffective laws and standards of ethics are guidelines accepted
by members of a society, and . . . these require the development of a social consensus.”); Colin
Wood, Rethinking Privacy: Though Technology Has Outspaced Policy, That’s No Reason To
Give Up, GOV’T TECH. (June 2, 2014), http://www.govtech.com/data/Rethinking-PrivacyThough-Technology-has-Outpaced-Policy-Thats-No-Reason-to-Give-Up.html [https://perma.cc/

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol72/iss5/9

24

Padgett: Implications of the Third-Party Doctrine: The New Age of Digital

2020]

IMPLICATIONS OF THE THIRD-PARTY DOCTRINE

929

must remain subject to police observation to protect people from criminal
conduct.197 For instance, scholar Herbert Packer published Two Models
of the Criminal Process in 1964, which established two theoretical
models of justice for criminal law: the crime-control model and the due
process model.198 “The crime-control model attempts to achieve
maximum efficiency in the repression of criminal conduct,” whereas the
due process model finds administrative restrictions necessary to prevent
individual suppression.199 As a whole, the models provide a guide to
operating the criminal justice system.200 The models are often categorized
as two “extremes” of the law, finding most individuals’ ideological
beliefs resting somewhere in the middle of the two concepts.201 The
crime-control model offers a presumption of guilt in adjudication,
whereas the due process model more so provides a presumption of
innocence.202 Considering that the crime-control model is based on
societal interests in security, there is an underlying assumption in
criminal law that individuals want to be protected.203 Of course, this
extreme view must be balanced with due process and individual rights in
relation to the state.204 This concept seems rather easy—the Court should
make and interpret laws to protect individuals from criminal activity and
to ensure that their privacy rights in relation to the state will not be
infringed upon. However, this concept is easier said than done, especially
when including continuous technological advances.
CSLI is a collection of time stamps placed on a cell phone from towers
picking up its signal and converting such energy into a telephone call or
a text message.205 Without such signal, the cell phone simply would not
work, rendering the phone useless. The Carpenter Court found that
accessing this information was an improper infringement on an
individual’s privacy rights. However, not only is such information a
J4BC-6TA2] (“Privacy is almost universally valued by humanity, but technology is advancing so
quickly that people haven’t even had time to settle on a useful definition for the word, let alone a
solution that everyone can live with.”).
197. See Belinda R. McCarthy, Case Attrition in the Juvenile Court: An Application of the
Crime Control Model, 4 JUST. Q. 237, 238 (1987).
198. Herbert Packer, Two Models of the Criminal Process, 113 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 6 (1964);
see McCarthy, supra note 197, at 238.
199. McCarthy, supra note 197, at 238.
200. Kent Roach, Four Models of the Criminal Process, 89 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 671,
672 (1999).
201. See, e.g., Vanessa A. Edkins & Kenneth D. Royal, Evaluating the Due Process and
Crime Control Perspectives Using Rasch Measurement Analysis, 7 J. MULTIDISCIPLINARY
EVALUATION 48, 50 (2011).
202. See id.
203. See Roach, supra note 200, at 672.
204. Id.
205. See Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2211 (2018).
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compilation of data that the phone company created to ensure efficient
telephone service, it also provides an effective means for police officers
to narrow their searches of individuals suspected of criminal or fraudulent
activity. This technological advancement is not accurate enough to
consider it a precise pinpoint location of an individual’s whereabouts, as
it does not equate to GPS.206 Additionally, information of this type has
long been used as an effective means for police officers to locate and
charge dangerous criminals.207 The ability of police officers to obtain
information that does not infringe on individual privacy any more than
ordinary business records already subject to government intrusion is
necessary for maintaining order and safety in society. It should be looked
at not as a means of infringement but as a means of possible protection.
However, just as the two models of criminal process illustrate,208 there
will always be two extremes to the law. True balance stems from a
democratic-style government because society balances itself out. It is
possible for the government to step too far into individual privacy rights
when it is not necessary or proper to do so. There must be a limit to
government power, but there must also be room for the government to do
its job. One job is to protect its citizens, but another is to incarcerate
criminals who undertake illegal behavior. CSLI is convoluted because it
provides information to the government that individuals have not had to
worry about in the past—simply because such information was not
feasible to obtain. However, advancement of technology does not, and
should
not,
automatically
render
newfound
information
unconstitutionally searched or seized. Fourth Amendment protection is
essential and serves as an outstanding guideline for privacy rights, but it
only applies when one’s life, liberty, or property is at stake.209
This protection does not extend to records held by a third party.210
Carpenter did not create the CSLI obtained by the police and should not
be permitted to claim such information as his personal property. He
simply dialed phone numbers, which provided the police with
information relating to which cell tower his cell phone used to obtain
signal.211 The information taken from the cell phone provider was less
precise than gatherings of GPS information because it only placed the
206. Contra id. at 2219−20 (claiming that the tracking in Carpenter equated to “a detailed
chronicle of a person’s physical presence”).
207. See, e.g., Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 737 (1979) (using a pen register to record
dialed phone numbers to track down a man continuously making threatening phone calls to a
woman whom he previously robbed).
208. See supra notes 198–204 and accompanying text.
209. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
210. See supra notes 33–35 and accompanying text.
211. See Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2212.

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol72/iss5/9

26

Padgett: Implications of the Third-Party Doctrine: The New Age of Digital

IMPLICATIONS OF THE THIRD-PARTY DOCTRINE

2020]

931

location “within a wedge-shaped sector ranging from one-eighth to four
square miles.”212 The government did not extract the location of the cell
phone itself but a range of space in which the user of the cell phone had
dialed phone numbers to make phone calls.213 Without the ability of the
cell towers to grant a user signal, the individual would not be able to make
a phone call. Carpenter is not a matter of privacy issues relating to
“tracking” an individual through his cell phone; rather, it is an argument
over which business records the Court deems accessible. This issue was
resolved over fifty years ago and should remain binding on the Court until
a more pressing and intrusive violation of an individual’s Fourth
Amendment rights is at stake. As a matter of doctrinal proceedings, it is
important to follow precedent when applicable. The third-party doctrine
set out in Smith and Miller provides an adequate remedy for Carpenter
because the time stamps (or CSLI) are nothing more than business
records held in the ordinary course of a service provider’s business of
providing effective cell service to its users.
CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court granted certiorari in Carpenter v. United States to
resolve a privacy issue concerning CSLI, which happens to be quite the
technological advancement since the beginning of the third-party
doctrine.214 However, the Court released a narrow opinion failing to
answer many questions concerning the state of the third-party doctrine
and privacy matters concerning technology in the new digital age. The
Court affirmatively answered the question of whether access to historical
cell phone records providing a comprehensive chronicle of the user’s past
movements constitutes a search deserving protection under the Fourth
Amendment.215 However, it analogized the case far more closely to
Jones, completely disregarding its application under Smith and Miller.216
This case should have been decided based on how and under what
circumstances such CSLI is retrieved and computed and, most
importantly, why. CSLI is a collection of time stamps that attach to one’s
phone from an automatic connection to whichever cell tower is within the
closest range.217 The time stamps show the relative location the user was
in, which is not nearly as precise as GPS tracking services.218 The Court
has previously admitted that it is not out of the ordinary for individuals
212.
213.
214.
215.
216.
217.
218.

Id. at 2218.
See id.
See id. at 2211.
Id.
Id. at 2220.
Id. at 2211.
See id.
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to expect their information, such as dialed telephone numbers and sent
text messages, to be held by a third party for legitimate business
purposes.219 Thus, failing to recognize that time stamps on cell phones
are only a means of providing effective service undermines the validity
of the third-party doctrine, which has proven itself greatly effective over
the past fifty years.
Fourth Amendment protection should never be disregarded when
one’s life, liberty, or property is at issue. But, as history has shown, that
protection does not apply to records held by a third party. Voluntarily
placing information in the hands of another individual effectively
destroys any expected privacy. This does not change simply because the
information is created by the third party, such as a log of time stamps
collected from when an individual uses his phone. Extracting a range of
space in which a user dialed phone numbers to make phone calls does not
amount to GPS tracking simply because it narrows down the possibility
of where an individual may be located. The Supreme Court resolved this
issue in Smith and Miller, which have been strong precedent for about
fifty years. Without more than just a disagreement over types of business
records, there is no need for a radical change in the law that does nothing
more than confuse the entire state of the third-party doctrine and leave
police officers unaware of what they are permitted to search.

219. See Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 743 (1979).
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